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Me, Myself and I: Aggregated and Disaggregated 
Identities on Social Networking Services 
Omer Tene1 
 
“The biggest reason [I avoided joining Facebook] was that I didn’t know which me 
would join. Apparently, Mark Zuckerberg believes we should all be the same in every 
context. According to Time’s 2010 Person of the Year profile of him, he once told a 
journalist, ‘Having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of integrity.’ To 
which my only response is, You’ve got to be kidding. I mean, I’m not even the same 
person with all the members of my immediate family. And I’ve long thought that my 
impulse to act differently with, say, my friend from grad school and my husband’s aunt 
— to adjust my personality to fit the situation and the other person — is an example of 
good manners, not bad ones.”2 
 
1. Introduction 
The Internet is used by more than 2 billion people worldwide for purposes ranging from electronic 
commerce, online banking, social networking, the consumption of media and the provision of electronic 
government services.3 However, the Internet was not built with an embedded security and privacy 
infrastructure;4 it lacks a system of identification5 and authentication.6 Typically, identity7 is managed one 
application at a time.8 This means that individuals are asked to maintain dozens of different usernames 
and passwords, one pair for each website with which they interact. The complexity of this approach is a 
burden to both individuals, who are driven to reuse passwords or utilize trivial ones such as relatives’ 
birthdates, making online fraud and identity theft easier; and businesses, which are required to manage the 
identity of users despite not having the resources or interest to do so.9 The Obama Administration’s recent 
                                                 
1
 Associate Professor, College of Management Haim Striks School of Law, Israel; Affiliate Scholar, Stanford Center 
for Internet and Society; Fellow, Center for Democracy and Technology. I would like to thank the College of 
Management Haim Striks School of Law research fund and the College of Management Academic Studies research 
grant for supporting research for this article. I would also like to thank the participants in the Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies Workshop on "Electronic Identity for Europe" for their helpful comments.  
2
 Curtis Sittenfeld, I’m on Facebook. It’s Over, NY Times Op Ed, September 3, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/opinion/sunday/if-im-on-facebook-it-must-be-over.html?_r=2. 
3
 Internet Usage Statistics, Internet World Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm.  
4
 Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It 31-33 (2008).  
5
 Identification is the process of evaluating – based on the data provided – who a given person is; it is the association 
of data with a particular human being. See John Palfrey & Urs Gasser, Digital Identity Interoperability and 
eInnovation, Berkman Publication Series (2007).  
6
 Authentication is the process of verifying the claimed identity of a user, process, or device. Ibid. 
7
 An identity is “any subset of attribute values of an individual person which sufficiently identifies this individual 
person within any set of persons. So usually there is no such thing as ‘the identity’, but several of them”. Marit 
Hansen & Hannes Tschofenig, Terminology for Talking about Privacy by Data Minimization: Anonymity, 
Unlinkability, Undetectability, Unobservability, Pseudonymity, and Identity Management, IETF Working Document, 
March 14, 2011, http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hansen-privacy-terminology. An identity of an individual person may 
comprise many partial identities of which each represents the person in a specific context or role. See generally Roger 
Clarke, Human Identification in Information Systems: Management Challenges and Public Policy Issues, 7,4 
Information Technology & People 6-37 (December 1994). 
8
 Identity management means “managing various identities (usually denoted by pseudonyms) of an individual person, 
i.e., administration of identity attributes including the development and choice of the partial identity and pseudonym 
to be (re-)used in a specific context or role.” Ibid. 
9
 Joseph Smarr, Plaxo, Google I/O 2008: OpenSocial, OpenID, and OAuth: Oh, My! (June 9, 2008),  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6SYnlH5FXz0, stating “every single site acts like you've never used another 
website before in your life.” 
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National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC)10 emphasizes the importance of allowing 
people to choose among multiple identity providers, including not only government entities but also 
private businesses, to issue trusted credentials that prove identity. This goal is based on the realization 
that digital identities are used extensively not only in contexts requiring strong authentication, such as 
electronic voting or banking, but also for participating in online games, commenting on blog posts, or 
accessing music profiles. In Europe too, policymakers realize that electronic signatures, formal identities 
and public sector applications constitute only a part of a larger identity ecosystem for which there is no 
existing regulatory framework.11 Increasingly, new focal points for the provision of identity services are 
emerging at the Internet’s application layer. These are primarily social networking services (SNS), such 
as Facebook or Google Plus (which allows users to log in with their Gmail credentials), which benefit 
from extensive membership and are seeking to branch out into the open web.12  
Indeed, Simson Garfinkel recently declared that “Facebook is in the process of transforming itself 
from the world's most popular social-media website into a critical part of the Internet's identity 
infrastructure.”13 He explains that Facebook is well suited to being the repository for people's identities on 
the Internet. Unlike many popular websites, it not only requires users to register and log in but also to 
"provide their real names and information."14 Indeed, Facebook has terminated accounts that were created 
with seemingly fake names or for fictional characters.15 Moreover, since Facebook users invest their 
accounts with a tremendous amount of durable personal content—including photographs, contact 
information, and connections to their social network—they are likely to keep a long-term relationship 
with the site. One of the most lucrative prospects for monetization by SNS operators of their role as 
purveyors of digital identity is the market for online and mobile payments. If SNS operators succeed in 
positioning themselves as providers or verifiers of digital identity for the purpose of processing payments, 
they stand to gain a cut of the entire market for e-commerce, which may be orders of magnitude greater 
than their current advertising revenues.16   
In this article I explore some of the legal issues arising from the transformation of SNS operators to 
providers of digital identity. I consider the implications of the involvement of private sector entities in the 
field of identity management and discuss some of the privacy implications, as well as the prospects for 
conciliation between online anonymity and pseudonymity, on the one hand, and the need for 
identifiability and accountability on the other hand.  
                                                 
10
 National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace: Enhancing Online Choice, Efficiency, Security, and 
Privacy, April 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/NSTICstrategy_041511.pdf. 
11
 Anssi Hoikkanen, Margherita Bacigalupo, Ramón Compañó, Wainer Lusoli & Ioannis Maghiros, New Challenges 
and Possible Policy Options for the Regulation of Electronic Identity, 5(1) J. Int’l Commercial L. & Tech. 1 (2010), 
http://www.jiclt.com/index.php/jiclt/article/view/95/94; Wainer Lusoli, Ioannis Maghiros & Margherita Bacigalupo, 
eID policy in a turbulent environment: is there a need for a new regulatory framework?, European Commission Joint 
Research Centre (2009), http://www.epractice.eu/files/eID%20policy%20in%20a%20turbulent%20environment.pdf.   
12
 Daniel Kahn, Social Intermediaries: Creating a More Responsible Web Through Portable Identity, Cross-Web 
Reputation, and Code-Backed Norms, 11 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 176 (2010).  
13
 Simson Garfinkel, Facebook Wants to Supply Your Internet Driver's License, Technology Review, January 5, 
2011, http://www.technologyreview.com/web/27027/page1/?a=f; also see Natasha Singer, Call It Your Online 
Driver’s License, NY Times, September 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/18/business/online-id-
verification-plan-carries-risks.html.  
14
 Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Date of Last Revision: April 26, 2011, 
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php. 
15
 The New York Times reported that Facebook recently de-activated an account used by world-acclaimed author 
Salman Rushdie, “demanded proof of identity and then turned him into Ahmed Rushdie, which is how he is identified 
on his passport. He had never used his first name, Ahmed, he pointed out; the world knows him as Salman.” Somini 
Sengupta, Rushdie Runs Afoul of Web’s Real-Name Police, NY Times, November 15, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/technology/hiding-or-using-your-name-online-and-who-
decides.html?_r=1&hpw.  
16
 See Launching Google Wallet on Sprint and working with Visa, American Express and Discover, The Official 
Google Blog, September 19, 2011, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/09/launching-google-wallet-on-sprint-
and.html; Jennifer Van Grove, Square Sets New Record: $2M Processed in One Day, Mashable, April 30, 2011,  
http://mashable.com/2011/04/29/square-payments.   
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2. Portability 
In the context of SNS, data portability, and especially portable online identity, can mean two very 
different things. First, with data portability users are able to carry their online identity with them across 
different websites and services, using a uniform user-identification system, as opposed to re-establishing 
their identity on each site. Instead of online identities being segregated into single-site territories, users 
utilize a single set of credentials to log into multiple sites and services. I will call this type of portability 
“credentials portability”.  
Second, portable online identity may mean that users are allowed to migrate between platforms with 
their established identity without being locked-in by an existing SNS. Hence, if you have an account on 
MySpace which you have invested in for years, creating a network of friends, posting content and 
comments, uploading photos etc., you will be able to transfer the data in the account en masse to 
Facebook without having to reestablish your network and reinvent your identity. I will call this type of 
portability “data portability”.  
Both credentials portability and data portability have costs and benefits. Credentials portability, 
essentially the introduction of a uniform protocol for authenticating user identity, solves the awkwardness 
of having to create a new account for each and every online service. It improves data security, since users 
who need to memorize dozens of user names and passwords tend to either use the same password over 
and over again; adopt passwords that are overly simplistic and easy for rogue actors to attack; record their 
passwords elsewhere; or use the “forgot my password” feature offered by many sites, effectively staking 
those sites’ data security on that of Gmail or another ubiquitous webmail services.  
The flip side, of course, is that malicious attackers who obtain such a “master key” can now infiltrate 
more websites than one.17 In a chilling illustration of these risks, hackers – ostensibly operated by the 
Iranian government – have recently infiltrated a Dutch certificate authority to issue forged Google 
certificates and used them to launch man-in-the-middle attacks against Gmail users and read their mail.18 
In its Interim Report analyzing the breach, security firm Fox-IT observes: “Not only the email itself, but 
also a login cookie could have been intercepted. Using this cookie the hacker is able to log in directly to 
the Gmail mailbox of the victim and also read the stored e-mails. Besides that, he is able to log in all other 
services Google offers to users like stored location information from Latitude or documents in Google 
Docs. Once the hacker is able to receive his targets’ email he is also able to reset passwords of others 
services like Facebook and Twitter using the lost password button. The login cookie stays valid for a 
longer period. It would be wise for all users in Iran to at least logout and login but even better change 
passwords”.19 Clearly, leaving the keys to one’s digital identity in the hands of a SNS operator is 
worrying.  
Another benefit of credentials portability is that it allows individuals to participate in the “reputation 
economy”, amalgamating their online presence to achieve cross-Web recognition.20 It also enhances trust 
in the sense advocated by David Johnson, Susan Crawford and John Palfrey in their important essay “The 
                                                 
17
 SNS operators still rely on a single user name and password to gain access to an account. In the future, they could 
employ two factor authentication, requiring users to access their mobile phones to complete the log in process. 
Facebook already monitors a number of "signals," including location and device, to determine when an account is 
suspect of being subjected to attack. Simon Axten, a spokesperson for Facebook, tells Simson Garfinkel: "Once we've 
flagged an attempt—even if the correct login credentials have been entered—we'll require the person logging in to 
provide additional authentication by, for example, answering a security question, entering a code sent via SMS, or 
identifying friends tagged in photos to which the account owner has access." Garfinkel, supra note 13. See generally, 
Giles Hogben, Security issues in the future of social networking, ENISA Position Paper for W3C Workshop on the 
Future of Social Networking, September 2008,  
http://www.w3.org/2008/09/msnws/papers/Future_of_SN_Giles_Hogben_ENISA.pdf.   
18
 Somini Sengupta, In Latest Breach, Hackers Impersonate Google to Snoop on Users in Iran, NY Times, August 30, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/technology/internet/hackers-impersonate-google-to-snoop-on-users-in-
iran.html?_r=4.  
19
 Fox-IT, DigiNotar Certificate Authority breach ‘Operation Black Tulip’, Interim Report, September 5, 2011, at p. 
8, http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2011/09/05/diginotar-public-report-
version-1/rapport-fox-it-operation-black-tulip-v1-0.pdf.  
20
 Kahn, supra note 12. Kahn points out that users can accrue cross-Web recognition even without a uniform identity 
using hyperlinks; i.e., you might place links and cross-links to your page on different websites referring other users, 
for example, from your homepage to your blog, Facebook, Twitter, Google Plus profiles, SSRN page, etc. Yet, as 
Kahn points out “this ad hoc method of linking cross-site activity does not scale; it might work to cross-link activities 
on a handful of sites, but not on a hundred”.   
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Accountable Internet”.21 Johnson, Crawford and Palfrey explain that new authentication, identification 
and authorization technologies will give users greater control over their digital connections so that online 
connections are established based on trust. They foresee an Internet where users are more accountable to 
one another than they have been in the past. 
The past few years have seen a proliferation of uniform authentication standards, most notably 
Facebook’s Open Graph (originally launched as Facebook Connect)22 and Google’s Friend Connect. 
Other projects include OpenID, an authentication service standard, which allows users to obtain a 
globally unique identity (a URL) which they can use anywhere, logging in to their OpenID provider 
instead of in to the sites that use OpenID; OAuth, which provides an authentication and authorization 
standard, allowing users to grant revocable, time- and scope-limited, third-party access capabilities to 
their account, instead of giving out their username and password which results in unrestricted access. 
The main drawback of a single sign on authentication mechanism is the privacy problem that it 
creates.23 Credentials portability essentially means putting your identity eggs in one basket. The multi-
directional data flows established by the implementation of credentials portability are staggering. They 
include data flows from third party websites and applications to the service provider, typically a SNS 
operator, which becomes privy to not only a user’s interaction with its service, but also with other 
websites that implement its user authentication platform. Hence, for example, a website participating in 
Facebook's Open Graph displays for users content that has been popular with their Facebook friends and 
allows them to share content they enjoy with others.24 A key feature of Open Graph is that sites can add a 
“like” or “recommend” button; when users click the button, it adds a link to the site on their Facebook 
profiles; shares the link with their Facebook friends; and displays their names and photographs to 
Facebook friends who visit the site.25 This functionality has recently been boosted by what Facebook calls 
“frictionless sharing”;26 the basic idea being that clicking a "Like" button is too burdensome so users can 
now authorize Facebook applications such as The Washington Post Social Reader or popular music 
streaming service Spotify to do the sharing for them with no additional action on their part.27 Even if a 
user does not click on the Like button, Facebook gets to see where she is browsing, since the user is 
literally “browsing” to Facebook via the iFrame integrating social features into the third party site. In 
other words, if you are a Facebook subscriber, then whenever you open a page showing the “like” button, 
your visit is reported to Facebook; you do not have to click the button to trigger this report; nor is the 
information conveyed to Facebook anonymized; the report contains your Facebook identity information 
as well as the URL of the page you are looking at.28 Indeed, a recent report alleged that Facebook 
monitors users’ activity on third party websites even when they are not logged in to the system.29 
                                                 
21
 David Johnson, Susan Crawford & John Palfrey, The Accountable Internet: Peer Production of Internet 
Governance, 9 Va. J. L. & Tech. 9, 82 (2004). 
22
 Facebook’s Open Graph, also known as the Facebook Platform, provides more than just the user authentication 
service Facebook Connect. It stands for a stack of services allowing applications—websites, desktop, mobile, 
applets—to be written on top of the Facebook social network, providing authentication, authorization, and access to 
the social graph. For authentication using Facebook’s platform see  
http://developers.facebook.com/docs/authentication.  
23
 Garfinkel, supra note 13; Marit Hansen & Ari Schwartz, Privacy and Identity Management, 6(2) IEEE Security & 
Privacy 38 (2008); Dave Birch, Internet driver's license?, Digital Identity Blog, January 10, 2011, 
 http://digitaldebateblogs.typepad.com/digital_identity/2011/01/internet-drivers-license.html. 
24
 See, e.g., Sara Inés Calderón, The New York Times Is Latest Newspaper to Tightly Integrate Facebook, Inside 
Facebook, September 1, 2010, http://www.insidefacebook.com/2010/09/01/new-york-times-facebook-login-social-
plugins.  
25
 For Facebook’s explanation of the “like” button see http://developers.facebook.com/docs/reference/plugins/like.   
26
 Ben Parr, Facebook Reveals Major Updates at F8 (Video), Mashable, September 22, 2011,  
http://mashable.com/2011/09/22/facebook-f8-live-video.   
27
 Frictionless sharing is an opt in service. Users must initially authorize a website or application to share their 
information with Facebook. In addition, users can specify on Facebook who will see their third party activity (e.g., 
only friends, the public). Richard MacManus, The Pros & Cons of Frictionless Sharing, ReadWriteWeb, September  
28, 2011, http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/frictionless_sharing_pros_cons.php.  
28
 James Brown, Gov2.0 and Facebook ‘Like’ Buttons, The Other James Brown, December 7, 2010,  
http://blogs.msdn.com/b/james_brown/archive/2010/12/07/gov2-0-and-facebook-like-buttons.aspx. 
29
 Nik Cubrilovic, Logging out of Facebook is not enough, Nik Cubrilovic Blog, September 25, 2011, 
http://nikcub.appspot.com/logging-out-of-facebook-is-not-enough; also see John Moe, Facebook is tracking you 
whether you're logged on, logged off, or not even a Facebook user, Marketplace Tech Report, September 27, 2011, 
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/09/27/tech-report-facebook-is-tracking-you.    
  
 
   
  
O. Tene 
   
 
122 
 
Facebook denied these charges and stated any monitoring was used strictly for “safety and protection”.30 
However, further reports stated that Facebook did change its logged out cookie policy as a result of the 
public discussion.31   
In the reverse direction, credentials portability provides websites and applications that participate in 
Open Graph with access to massive amounts of Facebook user data.32 For example, users who sign in 
with their Facebook credentials to travel website Tripadvisor are prompted to authorize the transfer of the 
following information from Facebook to the site:  
 
“Access my basic information. Includes name, profile picture, gender, networks, user 
ID, list of friends, and any other information I've made public.  
Send me email. TripAdvisor may email me directly at tene.omer@gmail.com·  
Access my data any time. TripAdvisor may access my data when I'm not using the 
application. 
Check-ins. TripAdvisor may read my check-ins and friends' check-ins. 
Access my profile information. Likes, Music, TV, Movies, Books, Quotes, Events, 
Hometown, Current City, Education History and Work History.  
Access information people share with me. Hometowns, Current Cities, Likes, Music, 
TV, Movies, Books, Quotes, Education History, Work History, Events, Photos and 
Videos.”33 
 
Many users who quickly click-through this notification in order to access the application may not be 
fully aware of the surprising amount of information shared by Facebook with this (randomly chosen) third 
party. It includes not only a user’s email address; but also offline access to her Facebook data (“access my 
data any time”) (i.e., when she is not visiting or using Tripadvisor); location information (“check ins”); 
and information posted and generated on Facebook by her friends (“information people share with me”). 
All of this information then becomes subject to Tripadvisor’s privacy policy, which authorizes the sharing 
of user data with third parties including third party vendors, business partners, referring websites, social 
media services, affiliated companies, law enforcement authorities, courts, and potential partners to 
corporate acquisitions.34    
Privacy problems related to credentials portability are not unsolvable. To begin with, users may be 
making a conscious choice to share information and get recommendations from their friends in return for 
a share of their privacy. Indeed, privacy-ceding online and mobile applications such as SNS and location-
                                                 
30
 ZDNet reported a Facebook spokesperson said: “Facebook does not track users across the web. Instead, we use 
cookies on social plugins to personalize content (e.g., show you what your friends liked), to help maintain and 
improve what we do (e.g., measure click-through rate), or for safety and security (e.g., keeping underage kids from 
trying to signup with a different age). No information we receive when you see a social plugins is used to target ads, 
we delete or anonymize this information within 90 days, and we never sell your information. Specific to logged out 
cookies, they are used for safety and protection, including identifying spammers and phishers, detecting when 
somebody unauthorized is trying to access your account, helping you get back into your account if you get hacked, 
disabling registration for a under-age users who try to re-register with a different birthdate, powering account security 
features such as 2nd factor login approvals and notification, and identifying shared computers to discourage the use 
of ‘keep me logged in’.” Emil Protalinski, Facebook denies cookie tracking allegations, ZDNet, September 25, 2011, 
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-denies-cookie-tracking-allegations/4044.  
31
 Emil Protalinski, Facebook fixes cookie behavior after logging out, ZDNet, September 27, 2011,  
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-fixes-cookie-behavior-after-logging-out/4120.  
32
 University of Virginia researchers found that over 90% of third party applications on Facebook have unnecessary 
access to private data. Adrienne Felt & David Evans, Privacy Protection for Social Networking Platforms, Workshop 
on Web 2.0 Security and Privacy (W2SP) 2008, http://w2spconf.com/2008/papers/s3p1.pdf. Also see Emily Steel & 
Geoffrey Fowler, Facebook in Privacy Breach: Top-Ranked Applications Transmit Personal IDs, a Journal 
Investigation Finds, Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2010,  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304772804575558484075236968.html.   
33
 To see this list click “Sign in with Facebook” on the top of Tripadvisor’s homepage, http://www.tripadvisor.com.  
34
 See Tripadvisor Privacy Policy, “With whom we share your information”,  
http://www.tripadvisor.com/pages/privacy.html.  
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based services are rapidly growing in popularity.35 Furthermore, platforms are currently being developed 
to facilitate more limited information sharing between SNS operators and third party websites. OAuth, for 
example, provides an authentication and authorization tool,36 allowing applications to indicate their 
permissions via a scope attribute, thus limiting the extent of information sharing.37 In NSTIC, the Obama 
administration set forth as its goal to “use privacy-enhancing technology and policies to inhibit the ability 
of service providers to link an individual’s transactions, thus ensuring that no one service provider can 
gain a complete picture of an individual’s life in cyberspace. By default, only the minimum necessary 
information will be shared in a transaction. For example, the Identity Ecosystem will allow a consumer to 
provide her age during a transaction without also providing her birth date, name, address, or other 
identifying data.”38 
Data portability, meanwhile, provides a user with the explicit right to withdraw her own data from a 
SNS and transfer them, as far as is technically feasible, into another application or service, unhindered by 
the incumbent SNS operator. Google has recently been applauded for introducing a data portability 
feature, Google Takeout, in connection with the launch of Google Plus.39 Google Takeout permits users 
of various Google products to export their contacts, Google Buzz feed, Picasa photo albums, Google 
profile and their “Stream” in a format readable by other SNS. Facebook, by contrast, allowed users to 
export only their photos and News Feed, and only as HTML files that can be saved locally on their 
computers. Facebook does not allow users to export their complete profile and friends’ contact details, 
stating this would be a violation of those third parties’ privacy.40 Given Facebook’s massive share of the 
SNS market, it is clear why Google pursues data portability more vigorously than its competitor.41  
Facebook stated that it “recognizes the value to users of data portability and has recently introduced a 
tool to allow its users to download a copy of their personal data from the service. This is a technically 
complex challenge given the rapidly evolving pace of development of services such as Facebook and 
because of the need to respect privacy settings for data that may have been uploaded by multiple 
individuals.”42 Facebook’s privacy concerns, while arguably self-serving and opportunistic, are not 
baseless. Absent standardization of policies, migrating an entire profile (or identity) from one SNS to 
                                                 
35
 One might get the impression that young people today simply do not care about privacy. Yet this would be a 
misconception. In fact, empirical research consistently proves the contrary. A recent Pew Report, shows young adults 
(aged 18-29) are more likely than older users to say they limit the amount of information available about them online. 
Mary Madden & Aaron Smith, Reputation Management Online: How people monitor and maintain their identity 
through search and social media, Pew Internet & American Life Project, May 26, 2010,  
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Reputation-Management.aspx. Moreover, the Pew Report finds that among 
users of social networking sites, young adults are the most proactive in customizing their privacy settings and 
restricting who can see certain updates. Similar results have been reached by a group of Berkeley researchers, 
suggesting “that young-adult Americans have an aspiration for increased privacy even while they participate in an 
online reality that is optimized to increase their revelation of personal data.” Chris Hoofnagle, Jennifer King, Su Li & 
Joseph Turow, How Different are Young Adults from Older Adults When it Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes 
and Policies?, April 14, 2010, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589864.  
For possible  explanations of the apparent discrepancy between users’ stated privacy preferences and their actions on 
SNS, see  danah boyd, Making Sense of Privacy and Publicity, Keynote Address, SXSW, March 13, 2010,  
http://www.danah.org/papers/talks/2010/SXSW2010.html; Kate Raynes-Goldie, Aliases, creeping, and wall cleaning: 
Understanding privacy in the age of Facebook, 15(1) First Monday (2010),  
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2775/2432.  
36
 Authorization is the mechanism by which a system determines what level of access a particular authenticated user 
should have to secured resources controlled by the system. See Steve Riley, It’s Me, and Here’s My Proof: Why  
Identity and Authentication Must Remain Distinct, Microsoft TechNet, February 14, 2006,  
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc512578.aspx.  
37
 Also see Susan Landau, Hubert Le Van Gong & Robin Wilton, Achieving Privacy in a Federated Identity 
Management System, Financial Cryptography and Data Security (2009). 
38
 NSTIC, supra note 10, at p. 2.  
39
 Ryan Singel, Taking on Facebook, Google’s Social Network Allows Data Exporting, Wired Epicenter, June 28, 
2011, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/06/google-facebook-export; Erick Schonfeld, Google Takeout, An 
Easier Way To Take Your Data With You, June 30, 2011, http://techcrunch.com/2011/06/30/google-takeout.  
40
 See, e.g., Stephen Shankland, Facebook blocks a second contact export tool, cnet, July  11, 2011,  
http://news.cnet.com/8301-30685_3-20078435-264/facebook-blocks-a-second-contact-export-
tool/#ixzz1WvX7D79p.  
41
 Declan McCullagh, Google wields data openness against Facebook, cnet, July 15, 2011,  
http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20079907-281/google-wields-data-openness-against-facebook. 
42
 Facebook Response to European Commission Communication on personal data protection in the European Union, 
May 22, 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/contributions/not_registered/facebook_en.pdf.    
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another may indeed result in mid-stream changes to privacy policies affecting third parties. James 
Grimmelmann expressed concern that data portability heightens the risk of divulging personal data which 
become subject to the privacy protections of the least secure site on which a user employs her account.43 
He argues that “while data portability may reduce vertical power imbalances between users and social 
network sites, it creates horizontal privacy trouble. Everyone who has access to ‘portable’ information on 
social network site A is now empowered to move that information to social network site B. In the process, 
they can strip the information of whatever legal, technical, or social constraints applied to it in social 
network site A.”44 Hence, personal data are only as secure as the least secure link in the chain through 
which they are transmitted.   
On the other hand, data portability helps assuage an important risk of SNS walled gardens, the risk of 
lock-in and unfair competition. The network effect in the SNS market is so evidently strong, and 
reputational costs for users of switching services so steep, that as time passes a single SNS operator could 
gain sufficient market power to lock in users and stifle competition.45 At the time this article is written, 
Facebook has 800 million users, 50 percent of whom log into the site on a daily basis. 250 million users 
access Facebook through their mobile devices.46 To prevent the market from ossifying, competitive 
pressures must be sustained, if not by the power of markets then by regulation. For example, a consumer 
organization in the United States filed an antitrust complaint with the Federal Trade Commission arguing 
Facebook leveraged its power in the SNS market to shepherd subscribers to exclusively use its virtual 
currency.47 Short of a full blown antitrust inquiry, mandating SNS operators to facilitate meaningful data 
portability could maintain competition despite the market’s unavoidable network effects.  
The antitrust argument could be countered, however, by SNS operators’ claim to maintain some 
degree of control over their user base. SNS operators may argue that given that they do not harness a 
proprietary technology or protected patents, data portability could destroy their business model. 
Facebook, for example, invested significant effort in perfecting its user interface to make it attractive for 
users. Allowing users to simply walk away with their data and network intact may strip Facebook of an 
asset which is at least jointly created with the users themselves.  
3. Aggregation vs. Disaggregation 
An additional cost of credentials portability is its dampening effect on the ability of users to disaggregate 
their online identities by browsing anonymously or using pseudonyms. Credentials portability inevitably 
contributes to the development of a uniform aggregated online identity. I am identified as the same user 
across numerous websites and platforms; it is not “me, myself and I” but rather just “me”. Moreover, SNS 
operators’ real name policies mean that web interactions gradually become less anonymous.  
To be sure, online anonymity has social costs. It is inversely correlated with accountability since it 
allows for harmful and deceptive self-identification, such as in the case of a child predator posing as a 
minor or a “troll” engaged in cyberbullying.48 As Johnson, Crawford and Palfrey put it, “[w]e cannot trust 
                                                 
43
 James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1137, 1194 (2009). 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 Randal Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud (Univ. Chi. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper 
No. 414, 2008), June 26, 2008, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1151985.   
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 Jia Lynn Yang, Facebook’s virtual currency draws antitrust complaints from consumer advocates, Washington 
Post, June 29, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/facebooks-virtual-currency-draws-antitrust-
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 Strictly speaking, anonymity can be reconciled with accountability through products delivering “verified 
anonymity”, such as Microsoft’s U-Prove. U-Prove was developed by Stefan Brands and his company Credentica, 
since purchased by Microsoft, to act as an intermediary between users and websites, allowing users to share their 
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ReadWriteWeb, March 2, 2010,  
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each other unless we know whom we are trusting.”49 On the other hand, anonymity – and particularly 
anonymous communications – has been recognized as an important aspect of the right to privacy50 and 
free speech.51 Remaining anonymous is crucial for political speech in totalitarian regimes, where 
dissidents are often persecuted by a government actively seeking to unmask anonymous critics.52 Yet it is 
also important in democratic societies, where individuals may be stymied from expressing views that are 
nonconforming, unconventional, or unpopular with their peers. For example, anonymity is necessary in 
order to shield whistleblowers inside corporations from retaliation by their superiors.53 Dan Solove 
observes that “[a]nonymity and pseudonymity protect people from bias based on their identities and 
enable people to vote, speak, and associate more freely by protecting them from the danger of reprisal.”54 
Accordingly, in NSTIC, the United States government promises that “the Identity Ecosystem will 
preserve online anonymity and pseudonymity, including anonymous browsing.”55  
While short of anonymity, disaggregation of identity remains a viable solution for users with 
pseudonymous identities.56 Pseudonymity allows users to amass reputational capital while at the same 
time avoiding the aggregation of their identities under their real name.57 With reputational capital comes 
increased accountability, since users have something to lose as a result of misbehavior.58 SNS operators, 
however, explicitly ban use of pseudonyms and active disaggregation of user identities.59 In its Statement 
of Rights and Responsibilities, Facebook not only requires users to use their real names but also forbids 
them from opening multiple accounts.60  
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 Johnson et al, supra note 21.  
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http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/28/china.news; also see Clive Thompson,  Google's China Problem (and 
China's Google Problem), NY Times, April 23, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/23/magazine/23google.html.  
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Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 139. 
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Abuse of Power, Apophenia, August 4, 2011, http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2011/08/04/real-
names.html; also see Jillian York, A Case for Pseudonyms, Electronic Frontier Foundation Blog, July 29, 2011, 
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 http://techliberation.com/2011/08/29/whats-in-a-pseudo-name-privacy-free-expression-real-names-on-google-
facebook/#more-38171.  
58
 See generally Ken Kumayama, Note, A Right to Pseudonymity, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 427 (2009). 
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The problem with such real name policies is that disaggregated identities linked to pseudonyms are no 
less “real” than aggregated identities associated with real names.61 In the offline world, we are not forced 
to present the same “face,” or identity, in all of our social interactions. We think, talk, and behave 
differently when we meet relatives, friends, dates, colleagues, business partners or our boss. Networking 
with colleagues on a business trip, we present quite a different persona than during a family dinner or on a 
trek to the Himalaya. In Online, however – and particularly in an ecosystem where identities become 
aggregated through credentials portability or otherwise – we are increasingly forced to present a uniform 
identity in all of our social interactions.62 In addition, seldom are our offline expressions and actions as 
persistently attached to our identity as they are online – tagged, categorized and stored under our name. 
This is not natural and leads to what danah boyd called “privacy fails,”63 or what Helen Nissenbaum 
views as fractures in contextual integrity.64 It is what happens when identities that are typically presented 
in different contexts become conflated. Imagine “partygoer me” crashing into a business meeting that “I” 
am attending.65  
Indeed, in most instances where SNS operators became involved in privacy snafus, they failed to 
respect disaggregated user identities. Consider the Google Buzz fiasco, where Google unilaterally 
implemented indiscriminate credentials portability to introduce Gmail users to a new social network. 
Users were horrified, and Google ended up paying dearly for mistakenly assuming that the “Gmail me” 
(i.e., the one who corresponds with a student, psychiatrist, or lover) could be merged by default with 
“myself” on Buzz (i.e., the one who communicates with friends or colleagues).66 A few years earlier, 
Facebook mistook the “shopping me” for “SNS I”, revealing through “Beacon” users’ purchases on third 
party websites to their friends.67   
Disaggregated identities do not even have to be pseudonymous. Technology can deliver 
disaggregation while users maintain a central identity in the background. Indeed, one of the most 
attractive features of Google’s new SNS, Google Plus, is “Circles”, which allows users to disaggregate 
their online identities with ease, sending updates to certain groups of people and not to others. A user can 
present a different identity to her high school friends, relatives, colleagues and followers, while at the 
same time continuing to use the same (assumingly real) name. Facebook, of course, provides similar 
functionality, although the user interface is not as intuitive as Google Plus’; is harder to navigate; and is 
set to present a uniform user identity by default to various categories of friends.68 The conflation of circles 
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of acquaintances on Facebook is a liability, since counter to Facebook’s ethos of increased sharing it 
causes users to hold back personal content, in fear of overexposure to colleagues; as well as professional 
content, in fear of boring their relatives and friends.69 It also impacts Facebook’s neutrality as a steward 
of identity,70 since by displaying professional updates to friends and relatives, Facebook could cause a 
user to rapidly decline in popularity and see her posts demoted on her friends’ News Feeds.71  
A potential retort to the promotion of disaggregated identities as a mechanism for user control over 
the dissemination of information is that content posted to a certain group can in any event seep through to 
other groups. Yet this problem does not negate the utility of disaggregation. We should not confuse the 
concept of secrecy with that of privacy and user control. As Dan Solove explains, under a secrecy 
paradigm, a privacy violation occurs only when concealed data is revealed to others; whereas if 
information is voluntarily turned over to a third party, there is no longer a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.72 This paradigm is overly narrow and based on a series of United States Supreme Court cases 
which viewed voluntary disclosure of information as an “assumption of risk” negating the right to 
privacy.73 In Europe, the whole thrust of data protection law pertains to the fair and lawful use of 
information by third parties; hence legal protection begins in Europe where it ends in the United States.74 
While information disclosed by users to a certain group of contacts could conceivably find its way to 
additional third parties (SNS contacts or not), the same could happen offline. For example, a relative 
participating in a party you attended can tell your boss she saw you get drunk. Offline as online, worlds 
can collide. Yet with disaggregated identities, users can maintain a certain degree of control over their 
information, as they do offline. That is a worthy goal to pursue.   
4. Neutrality 
SNS operators benefit from a wide degree of control over numerous attributes of user identities. They can 
influence how one is portrayed online – as a warm family man or an ambitious professional; an art-loving 
bohemian or a wine connoisseur. To be sure, some decisions with respect to the content posted or 
uploaded by users are subject to user control. For example, a user can decide whether or not she will 
upload a photo to a SNS or identify another user as a friend or relative. However, many other decisions 
remain in the sole domain of SNS operators with very little transparency for users. This includes the 
handling of “meta data” concerning users’ interaction with the SNS; whose profiles a user viewed; whom 
she was tagged with; how long she lingered on a page; which links she “liked” or clicked through; what 
content she was interested in; which devices she used; and what locations she visited.75 It also includes 
deciding which information will be promoted and featured prominently for others to see and which 
pushed down and therefore relegated to oblivion.76 Facebook, for example, uses algorithms to filter users’ 
News Feeds to only show content from people Facebook determines they are most interested in. The 
implications are clear: Users will view me as a family man if they see the pictures I upload of my kids; as 
a professional if they see my legal updates. Facebook’s control over the digital curation of users’ identity 
has recently deepened with the merging of the “Top News” and “Most Recent” tabs in the News Feed 
into a single column.77  
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Why do Joe’s wall posts appear at the top of his friends’ News Feed, while Jane’s remain discrete and 
visible by only her mother? Who will get Jerry’s Google Plus postings on their Stream and who will not? 
The answers to these questions are left to conjecture based on opaque statements of SNS operators.78 For 
example, in its Help Center Facebook replies to the question “How does News Feed determine which 
content is most interesting?” as follows: “The News Feed algorithm bases this on a few factors: how 
many friends are commenting on a certain piece of content, who posted the content, and what type of 
content it is (e.g., photo, video, or status update).”79 This explanation provides precious little information 
about the logic and considerations underlying Facebook’s decision-making process. Is Facebook 
motivated by commercial interests? Political considerations? Could its decisions be arbitrary? Mistaken? 
Is Facebook “neutral”? We simply do not know.  
Our SNS identity consists of the sum of our activity on and interaction with the service. The fact that 
SNS operators enjoy a great degree of control over complete vectors of our identity is troubling. 
Transparency,80 accountability,81 and user control82 are fundamental principles of privacy and data 
protection law in Europe and elsewhere. Each of these principles is challenged by the delegation of 
control over online identity to unaccountable actors.  
To be sure, algorithms determining which content to promote or search results to display are 
proprietary trade secrets of SNS operators. Forcing SNS operators to disclose these algorithms would 
dampen innovation. Yet there is a clear feeling that we deserve more than we are getting.83 Consider 
Article 12 of the European Data Protection Directive, which provides that “Member States shall guarantee 
every data subject the right to obtain from the controller (…) knowledge of the logic involved in any 
automatic processing of data concerning him at least in the case of the automated decisions (…)”. How 
                                                                                                                                               
discussion in Jason Kincaid, Facebook News Feed Gets Smarter— And the Ticker Makes its Big Debut, Techcrunch, 
September 20th, 2011,  
http://techcrunch.com/2011/09/20/facebook-news-feed-gets-smarter%E2%80%94%C2%A0and-the-ticker-makes-its-
big-debut.  
78
 See, e.g., Thomas E. Weber, How Facebook Decides What To Put In Your News Feed – These 10 Secrets Reveal 
All, Business Insider, 18 October 2010, http://www.businessinsider.com/how-facebook-decides-what-to-put-in-your-
news-feed--these-10-secrets-reveal-all-2010-10.   
79
 Facebook Help Center, “How does News Feed determine which content is most interesting?”, 
http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=166738576721085.  
80
 The transparency (or openness) principle appears in the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Sep. 23, 1980, 
 http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html (the “OECD Guidelines”); as 
well as in the Articles 10-11 of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (European Data Protection Directive); and numerous privacy and data protection laws 
around the world.  
81
 The accountability principle appears in the OECD Guidelines as well as in Canada’s federal privacy legislation, the 
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), (S.C. 2000, c. 5), Schedule 1, Principle 
4.1, titled “Accountability”; though not in the European Data Protection Directive. This may soon change, as the 
European Data Protection Directive is being reviewed and the introduction of an accountability principle pursued by 
both the European Commission and the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. See European Commission, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, A comprehensive strategy on data protection in the European Union, Brussels, 
COM(2010) 609, November 4, 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0006/com_2010_609_en.pdf 
(“Commission Communication”); Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion /2010 on the principle of 
accountability, WP 173, July 13, 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp173_en.pdf; 
Article 29 Working Party, The Future of Privacy: Joint contribution to the Consultation of the European Commission 
on the legal framework for the fundamental right to protection of personal data, WP 168, December 1, 2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp168_en.pdf. Cf. in the United States, Department 
of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, Green Paper on Privacy and Innovation in the Internet Economy: A 
Dynamic Policy Framework, December 16, 2010,  
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/iptf_privacy_greenpaper_12162010.pdf (the “Green Paper”).   
82
 The user control (or consent) principle is a fundamental building block of any privacy and data protection 
legislation. See Articles 7(a) and 8(2)(a) of the European Data Protection Directive; Schedule 1 Principle 3 of the 
PIPEDA; the Green Paper. For the “notice and choice” framework in the United States, see Preliminary FTC Staff 
Report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and 
Policymakers, December 2010, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf.  
83
 Beth Simone Noveck, Trademark Law and the Social Construction of Trust: Creating the Legal Framework for 
Online Identity, 83 Wash. U. L. Q. 1733, 1778-79 (2005), arguing that “[i]f I am to be accorded a reputational score, I 
ought to know what the criteria are”. 
  
 
   
  
Me, Myself and I: Aggregated and Disaggregated Identities on Social Networking Services 
   
 
 
129 
 
exactly does an SNS operator determine who our best friends are and which content to display on our 
News Feed? 
The (lack of) neutrality problem was explored by Eli Pariser in his book “The Filter Bubble: What the 
Internet Is Hiding from You”.84 Pariser thinks that increased personalization of the Internet, in search, 
advertising and SNS, poses a risk to open society and democratic discourse. He explains that if you have 
hundreds of Facebook friends, you will see relevant updates from only a subset of them that Facebook 
deems “closest”. This effectively compartmentalizes society into pockets (or echo chambers) of 
likeminded individuals sharing similar backgrounds. For example, conservatives will only see content 
posted by fellow conservatives, while updates from their liberal acquaintances – even if they “friend” 
them – will be suppressed.85 Pariser believes government should regulate information intermediaries to 
ensure users have full control over their data.  
More troubling, as the Internet’s “social layer” evolves, editorial control of SNS operators extends 
beyond the walled garden of the SNS to the open Internet. Bing recently announced: “Starting today, you 
can receive personalized search results based on the opinions of your friends by simply signing into 
Facebook (…). Decisions can now be made with more than facts, now the opinions of your trusted friends 
and the collective wisdom of the Web.”86 Hence, Facebook promotion or demotion of content posted to 
the site by users will now affect not only the profiles of those users but also the search results yielded by 
their friends. In addition, SNS identities are increasingly harnessed for important offline decisions in the 
field of employment, insurance or credit.87 The New York Times recently reported that “Companies have 
long used criminal background checks, credit reports and even searches on Google and LinkedIn to probe 
the previous lives of prospective employees. Now, some companies are requiring job candidates to also 
pass a social media background check.”88 The treasure trove of information about job candidates, 
employees, loan or insurance applicants, and prospective tenants, is too attractive for businesses to 
ignore.89 This means that the stakes are becoming higher for users, even as control over their SNS 
identity withers.90   
5. Deletion 
When users create content on platforms owned by SNS operators, they grant operators a great deal of 
control over what they have produced. Users who make Facebook or Google Plus their primary online 
presence deposit something of great economic and emotional value with those SNS operators. They 
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delegate to Facebook or Google stewardship over their digital identity. This has two important 
implications. 
First, the prospect of having such identity intentionally or accidentally deleted is disconcerting. In its 
efforts to enforce its “real name policy,” which forbids pseudonymous profiles, Google recently deleted a 
large number of user profiles allegedly not using “real” names.91 Mashable reported that “while some of 
the suspended accounts were indeed fake profiles, others like Limor ‘Ladyada’ Fried and lifestyle blogger 
A.V. Flox were accidentally deleted and quickly restored.”92 A wave of angry user blog posts prompted 
Google to amend its procedure for enforcement of its real name policy, providing users with a four-day 
“grace period” to fix a profile name before any further action is taken.93 If a profile is suspended for a 
names violation, Google has been reported to require users to verify their identity by presenting either 
government issued identity documentation or a link to a profile on another social network with a similarly 
strict naming policy, like Facebook.94 Facebook too enforces a real name policy and has been known to 
delete pseudonymous accounts.95 In one recent case, Facebook deleted the profile of Zhao Jing, better 
known as Michael Anti, a Chinese human rights activist, despite his extensive activity as a dissident 
under that name over the course of many years.96 The loss of the network of contacts, as well as the links, 
updates and photos posted to a SNS can be devastating.97 Internet scholar danah boyd explains that “even 
when folks have a negative reputation, they often don’t want to lose the positive reputation that they’ve 
built. Starting at zero can be a lot harder than starting with a mixed record.”98 
The second implication is that users should benefit from the autonomy to terminate their accounts and 
delete their profiles at will. One of the earliest public controversies surrounding Facebook concerned its 
account deletion policy. While users could deactivate their accounts, they were not able to delete content 
accumulated in their profile from Facebook servers.99 In February 2008, as a result of public criticism and 
an inquiry by the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner’s Office, Facebook began to allow users 
to permanently delete their accounts. Currently, Facebook explains in its privacy policy: “If you want to 
stop using your account you may deactivate it or delete it. When you deactivate an account, no user will 
be able to see it, but it will not be deleted. (…) We save your profile information (connections, photos, 
etc.) in case you later decide to reactivate your account. (…) When you delete an account, it is 
permanently deleted from Facebook.”100  
The ability to shed an online identity or disengage from a SNS sparked public controversy following 
the suggestion of Google’s (then) CEO Eric Schmidt that “every young person one day will be entitled 
automatically to change his or her name on reaching adulthood in order to disown youthful hijinks stored 
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on their friends' social media sites.”101 danah boyd was not amused: “This is ludicrous on many accounts. 
First, it completely contradicts historical legal trajectories where name changes have become increasingly 
more difficult. Second, it fails to account for the tensions between positive and negative reputation. Third, 
it would be so exceedingly ineffective as to be just outright absurd.”102 Schmidt’s comment was 
generally depicted103 as (another)104 snide remark from the head of a company which utilizes personal 
data as raw material for its products and services.105 In fact, however, Schmidt’s prediction echoes a 
proposal by another Internet thought leader, Jonathan Zittrain, to allow individuals to declare 
“reputational bankruptcy”.106 Zittrain suggests that as identity grows in importance on the Internet, “the 
intermediaries demanding it ought to consider making available a form of reputation bankruptcy. Like 
personal financial bankruptcy, or the way in which a state often seals a juvenile criminal record and gives 
a child a ‘fresh start’ as an adult, we ought to consider how to implement the idea of a second or third 
chance into our digital spaces.”107 Hence, not unlike Schmidt, Zittrain proposes providing users with a 
chance for a reputational fresh start.   
The concept of reputational bankruptcy, in turn, is related to a debate raging over the past year or so 
on both sides of the Atlantic with respect to the so called “right to be forgotten,” better known in French 
as the droit d’oubli.108 In its Communication on “A comprehensive approach on personal data protection 
in the European Union”, the European Commission expressed its intention to “clarify[…] the so-called 
‘right to be forgotten’, i.e. the right of individuals to have their data no longer processed and deleted when 
they are no longer needed for legitimate purposes.”109 Similarly, EU Justice Commissioner Vivienne 
Reding stated: “Peoples’ rights need to be built on four pillars: The first is the ‘right to be forgotten’: a 
comprehensive set of existing and new rules to better cope with privacy risks online.”110 Thus, the right 
to be forgotten has emerged as a central tenet of the reshaping European data protection framework. 
To some extent, a right to be forgotten already exists under Article 6(1)(e) of the Data Protection 
Directive, which provides that “Member States shall provide that personal data must be: (…) kept in a 
form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for 
which the data were collected or for which they are further processed.”111 Yet it would be risky to extend 
the existing provision to accommodate a full blown right to be forgotten. First, even the currently existing 
provision requires a delicate balancing act between the obligation to delete data and a multitude of data 
retention requirements; such as those in anti-money laundering acts, communications data retention 
legislation, or United States electronic discovery regulations.112 Businesses often find themselves in a 
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quagmire trying to assess whether they are obliged to delete or retain data; for how long; and for which 
purposes.113 Second, the right to be forgotten is often a euphemism for a “right to delete negative 
information published about you”. Few people are interested in getting rid of positive information. Hence, 
the right to be forgotten may be better phrased as a “right to have your sins forgotten”, protecting not so 
much privacy but rather reputation. As Jeffrey Rosen puts it: “What people seem to want is not simply 
control over their privacy settings; they want control over their online reputations. But the idea that any of 
us can control our reputations is, of course, an unrealistic fantasy.”114 Third, despite the ongoing public 
debate, there is persistent lack of clarity with respect to the specifics (let alone mechanics) of the right to 
be forgotten. Sure enough, you should be able to delete a photo you posted on your SNS profile; but 
should you be authorized to delete a photo of you that I post on my SNS profile? Or request that Google 
suppress a link to a photo you initially posted but that is currently echoed on various third party websites? 
Or if you post a comment on your profile and I copy it onto my profile, could you demand that I delete 
it?115 Clearly, implementing such a right would implicate potential conflicts with freedom of speech as 
well as the rules on intermediary liability. Finally, consider that while the right to be forgotten benefits 
individuals with minor vices, it also facilitates more malicious behavior, such as “trolling” and then 
deserting an account.116 Lior Strahilevitz warns that “users with poor reputations can always ‘flush’ their 
existing identities and start over with a blank slate.”117  Consequently, there is inherent tension between 
the right to be forgotten and the accountability of online actors. 118  
6. Conclusion 
The Internet is a giant shopping mall, library, town square, dating site, government arena, outlet for free 
speech and political dissent, and much more. Digital identity is used online not only in contexts requiring 
strong authentication, but also in less formal interactions where anonymous, pseudonymous, and 
disaggregated identities can suffice. Increasingly, SNS operators are harnessing their broad user base and 
wealth of personal information to become vital components of the Internet's identity layer. The provision 
of identity management tools by SNS operators for purposes of authentication, identification and 
authorization raises thorny problems of privacy, security and user control.  
SNS operators can influence how users are portrayed online, raising question marks with respect to 
their neutrality. Credentials portability, while enhancing transactional efficiencies, creates privacy 
concerns, as user data from third party websites is amalgamated by SNS operators. Data portability 
reduces risk of lock in and concentration of power but challenges the protection of third parties’ personal 
data under shifting privacy policies. The power to delete a user’s profile is key, ranging from SNS 
operators’ deletion of pseudonymous user accounts to users’ claiming a “right to be forgotten” with 
respect to content stored on a SNS. The optimal mix of features would allow SNS operators to provide 
credentials portability while at the same time letting users maintain disaggregated identities and obtain 
authorizations on an anonymous or pseudonymous basis. 
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